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Introduction
Organizations of all sizes in both the public and private sectors are increasingly reliant on information and technology assets, supported by people and facility assets, to successfully execute business processes that, in turn, support the delivery of services. Failure of these assets has a direct, negative impact on the business processes they support. This, in turn, can cascade into an inability to deliver services, which ultimately impacts the organizational mission. Given these relationships, the management of risks to these assets is a key factor in positioning the organization for success.
Operational cyber security risks are defined as operational risks to information and technology assets that have consequences affecting the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of information or information systems. This report presents a taxonomy of operational cyber security risks that attempts to identify and organize the sources of operational cyber security risk into four classes:
(1) actions of people, (2) systems and technology failures, (3) failed internal processes, and (4) external events. Each class is broken down into subclasses, which are described by their elements. Operational risks are defined as those arising due to the actions of people, systems and technology failures, failed internal processes, and external events. The CERT ® Program, part of Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute (SEI), developed these four classes of operational risk in the CERT ® Resilience Management Model [Caralli 2010b] , which draws upon the definition of operational risk adopted by the banking sector in the Basel II framework [BIS 2006] . Within the cyber security space, the risk management focus is primarily on operational risks to information and technology assets. People and facility assets are also considered to the extent that they support information and technology assets.
This taxonomy can be used as a tool to assist in the identification of all applicable operational cyber security risks in an organization. Toward that end, this report also discusses the harmonization of the taxonomy with other risk identification and analysis activities such as those described by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 [FISMA 2002] , security guidance contained within the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publications series, and the threat profile concept contained within the CERT Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation SM (OCTAVE ® ) method.
This second version of the technical note is an update to the original report (CMU/SEI-2010-TN-028) that was published in December 2010. This version provides a taxonomy mapping in Appendices A and B that corresponds with version 4 of NIST SP 800-53.
® CERT and OCTAVE are registered marks owned by Carnegie Mellon University.
SM
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.
Taxonomy of Operational Cyber Security Risks
The taxonomy of operational cyber security risks, summarized in Table 1 and detailed in this section, is structured around a hierarchy of classes, subclasses, and elements. The taxonomy has four main classes:
• actions of people-action, or lack of action, taken by people either deliberately or accidentally that impact cyber security
• systems and technology failures-failure of hardware, software, and information systems
• failed internal processes-problems in the internal business processes that impact the ability to implement, manage, and sustain cyber security, such as process design, execution, and control
• external events-issues often outside the control of the organization, such as disasters, legal issues, business issues, and service provider dependencies Each of these four classes is further decomposed into subclasses, and each subclass is described by its elements. The structure of this taxonomy is derived from risk taxonomies previously developed by the SEI in the engineered systems operations [Gallagher 2005 ] and high-performance computing software development [Kendall 2007 ] subject areas.
Additionally, this taxonomy complements the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Risk Lexicon [DHS 2008 ] by describing instances of operational cyber security risks in greater detail. These risks are a small subset of the universe of risks of concern to DHS and covered by its lexicon.
It is important to note that risks can cascade: risks in one class can trigger risks in another class. In this case, the analysis of a particular risk may involve several elements from different classes. For example, a software failure due to improper security settings could be caused by any of the elements of inadvertent or deliberate actions of people.
Actions of people describes a class of operational risk characterized by problems caused by the action taken or not taken by individuals in a given situation. This class covers actions by both insiders and outsiders. Its supporting subclasses include inadvertent actions (generally by insiders), deliberate actions (by insiders or outsiders), and inaction (generally by insiders).
Subclass 1.1 Inadvertent
The inadvertent subclass refers to unintentional actions taken without malicious or harmful intent. Inadvertent actions are usually, though not exclusively, associated with an individual internal to the organization. This subclass is composed of the elements mistakes, errors, and omissions. The inaction subclass describes a lack of action or failure to act upon a given situation. Elements of inaction include a failure to act because of a lack of appropriate skills, a lack of knowledge, a lack of guidance, and a lack of availability of the correct person to take action. 
Class 3 Failed Internal Processes
Failed internal processes describes a class of operational risk associated with problematic failures of internal processes to perform as needed or expected. Its supporting subclasses include process design or execution, process controls, and supporting processes.
Subclass 3.1 Process Design or Execution
The process design or execution subclass deals with failures of processes to achieve their desired outcomes due to process design that is improper for the task or due to poor execution of a properly designed process. The process controls subclass addresses process failures due to inadequate controls on the operation of the process. The elements of this subclass are status monitoring, metrics, periodic review, and process ownership. The supporting processes subclass deals with operational risks introduced due to failure of organizational supporting processes to deliver the appropriate resources. The supporting processes of concern are the elements staffing, accounting, training and development, and procurement.
status monitoring-failure

staffing-failure to provide appropriate human resources to support its operations
funding-failure to provide appropriate financial resources to support its operations
training and development-Failure to maintain the appropriate skills within the workforce
procurement-failure to provide the proper purchased service and goods necessary to support operations
Class 4 External Events
External events describes a class of operational risk associated with events generally outside the organization's control. Often the timing or occurrence of such events cannot be planned or predicted. The supporting subclasses of this class include disasters, legal issues, business issues, and service dependencies.
Subclass 4.1 Hazards
The hazards subclass deals with risks owing to events, both natural and of human origin, over which the organization has no control and that can occur without notice. The elements supporting this subclass include weather event, fire, flood, earthquake, unrest, and pandemic. The legal issues subclass deals with risks potentially impacting the organization due to the elements regulatory compliance, legislation, and litigation.
regulatory compliance-new governmental regulation or failure to comply with existing regulation
legislation-new legislation that impacts the organization
litigation-legal action taken against the organization by any stakeholder, including employees and customers Subclass 4.3 Business Issues
The business issues subclass, described by the elements of supplier failure, market conditions, and economic conditions, deals with operational risks arising from changes in the business environment of the organization.
4.3.1 supplier failure-the temporary or permanent inability of a supplier to deliver needed products or services to the organization
market conditions-the diminished ability of the organization to sell its products and services in the market
economic conditions-the inability of the organization to obtain needed funding for its operations Subclass 4.4 Service Dependencies
The service dependencies subclass deals with risks arising from the organization's dependence on external parties to continue operations. The subclass is associated with the elements of utilities, emergency services, fuel, and transportation. 
Harmonization with Other Risk Practices
The taxonomy can be used as a tool to help identify all applicable operational cyber security risks in an organization. To provide context and prioritize and manage these risks in a structured manner, a basic understanding of the relationships among assets, business processes, and services needs to be established. Assets are the basic units of value in the organization. There are four primary types of assets: people, information, facilities, and technology. In the cyber security arena, the primary focus is on operational risks to information and technology assets, although people and facility assets are also considered. Assets are the building blocks of business processes. Business processes are the activities that support the organization's delivery of services. The relationships among assets, business processes, and services are shown in Figure 1 . [Caralli 2010a] Failure of these assets can have a direct, negative impact on the business processes that they support. This, in turn, cascades into an inability to deliver services and ultimately impacts the mission of the organization. The taxonomy can assist in identifying operational risks in all four classes (actions of people, systems and technology failures, failed internal processes, and external events) to each of the four asset types.
Risk management involves a balance between risk conditions (such as threats and vulnerabilities) and risk consequences. As part of a risk management strategy, protective and sustaining controls are applied to assets, as shown in Figure 2 . [Caralli 2010a] Protective controls are intended to help manage risk conditions, while sustaining controls are intended to help manage risk consequences. In both cases, controls are applied at the asset level.
FISMA
The taxonomy provides a structured set of terms that covers all of the significant risk elements that could impact cyber security operations. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), which applies to U.S. federal government agencies, provides a working definition of information security. This definition links the identified operational cyber security risks to specific examples of consequences impacting confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This is an important building block in the control selection and risk mitigation process. The FISMA definition of information security reads as follows:
The term "information security" means protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
NIST Special Publications
In addition to providing the definition of information security described above, the FISMA legislation also tasked the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with developing information security guidelines for use by federal agencies. These guidelines are known as the NIST Special Publications (SP). Of particular interest is NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4 [NIST 2013 ], which provides a control catalog to be applied to federal information systems based on an analysis of the system's relative importance and consequence of loss. The controls specified in NIST SP 800-53 are primarily protective in nature and are applied tactically at the information-system level. In general, the controls specified in NIST SP 800-53 are at a lower level than the elements in the taxonomy. The taxonomy can be used as a tool to link the application of these controls into a broader risk management strategy. A mapping of the control catalog in NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4 to the risk subclasses identified in the taxonomy is provided in Appendix A. This appendix can be used to match NIST control families to types of operational cyber security risk. Appendix B provides the reverse: a mapping of taxonomy subclasses to the NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4 control catalog. Appendix B can be used to determine which NIST controls to consider in order to mitigate specific operational cyber security risks.
SEI OCTAVE Threat Profiles
The OCTAVE method, developed by the SEI, provides a process for an organization to perform a comprehensive security risk evaluation. Phase 1 of the OCTAVE method uses the concept of asset-based threat profiles. While it is not the intent of this report to provide a detailed discussion of OCTAVE, the threat profiles are introduced here as a useful, graphical vehicle to link assets to risks and consequences, in-line with the definition of operational security risks. OCTAVE uses four standard threat categories: (1) human actors using network access, (2) human actors using physical access, (3) system problems, and (4) other problems. These generic categories can easily be extended or tailored to suit the particular need. In general, the threat categories from OCTAVE align with the classes in the risk taxonomy as follows:
• humans with network access -actions of people class The threat profiles are represented graphically in a tree structure. Figure 3 through Figure 6 below illustrate the OCTAVE generic threat profiles for the four threat categories. The taxonomy and the techniques described in OCTAVE can serve as cross-checks to each other to ensure coverage of all classes of operational cyber security risk.
Conclusion
This report presents a taxonomy of operational cyber security risks and also discusses the relationship of the taxonomy to other risk and security activities. The taxonomy organizes the definition of operational risk into the following four classes: (1) actions of people, (2) systems and technology failures, (3) failed internal processes, and (4) external events. Each of these four classes is further decomposed into subclasses and elements. Operational cyber security risks are defined as operational risks to information and technology assets that have consequences affecting the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information and information systems. The relationship of operational risks to consequences is discussed in the context of FISMA, the NIST Special Publications, and the OCTAVE method.
We anticipate that revisions to the taxonomy will be necessary to account for changes in the cyber risk landscape. The present taxonomy is being validated through fieldwork with organizations under varying levels of regulatory compliance obligation and risk tolerance. The results of this fieldwork will inform taxonomy revisions. Table 2 can be used to match NIST control families to types of operational cyber security risk.
Appendix A: Mapping of NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 Controls to Selected Taxonomy Subclasses and Elements
References to taxonomy subclasses and elements refer to the numbering scheme shown in Table 1 and the body of this report. For example, item 1.1 refers to the subclass inadvertent actions of people (all elements apply), and item 2.2.2 refers to the configuration management element of systems and technology failures -software. 4, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 16, 17, 18, 12, 11, 2, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 3, 5, [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [17] [18] [10] [11] [12] [13] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [27] [28] [29] [30] 32, 34, [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [10] [11] [12] [14] [15] [16] [17] 15 4, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 14, 12, 14, [7] [8] [9] [11] [12] [13] IA -1-9 MA -1-6 PL-8 SA - [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 17, [10] [11] [12] [13] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] 34 5, 6, 14, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] 24, 3, 5, 7, 9, [11] [12] [13] 16 CA -1-3, 5, 6, 9 CM -1-11 CP -1, 4, 9, 10, 11 IA -1-9 IR -1, 3-10 MA -1-6 MP -1-8 PE - 
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